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Is It Law or Something Else?: A
Divided Judiciary in the Application of
Fraudulent Transfer Law under § 546(e)
of the Bankruptcy Code
Jaclyn Weissgerber
Where two groups of identical subjects are presented with the same
set of stimuli, and they respond differently, an explanation is needed.
Further, when the subjects do not merely respond randomly, but rather in
one of two specific ways, this need for explanation becomes more
apparent. In this Note, I will focus on the divide between bankruptcy
judges and federal appellate judges in their interpretation of § 546(e) of
the Bankruptcy Code,1 as applied to leveraged buyouts in bankruptcy, in
the determination of whether creditors may use fraudulent conveyance
law to recover funds for the bankruptcy estate.
My position is that there is a defined and radical difference in
interpretation of § 546(e), commonly known as the ‘settlement payment
exception,’ as between bankruptcy judges and the federal appellate
judges reviewing these decisions.2 In order to explore this divergence, I
conducted an empirical study to determine the existence and magnitude
of this division based on the court opinions within each federal circuit.
My goal was first to describe this division and then to explain why
bankruptcy judges and federal appellate judges have adopted such
radically different positions. A review of all of the § 546(e) case law
demonstrates that eighty-six percent of federal appellate judges hold that
a trustee may not use fraudulent conveyance law to avoid transfers made
to shareholders in the context of a leveraged buyout as a result of §



Law Clerk to the Honorable Diane Davis, United States Bankruptcy Judge,
N.D.N.Y.; J.D. Pace University School of Law; B.S. State University of New York at
Geneseo. My sincerest gratitude to Professor David Cohen for providing the valuable
commentary and guidance that made this work possible.
1. 11 U.S.C. §§ 101-1532 (2012) (“Bankruptcy Code”). Unless otherwise indicated,
all further section references are to the Bankruptcy Code.
2. The study excluded district court decisions because there was no clear trend of
interpretation of § 546(e). The data are current as of August 2014.
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546(e).3 By comparison, only thirty-seven percent of bankruptcy judges
autonomously hold that a trustee may not use fraudulent conveyance law
as a result of § 546(e).4 This means that sixty-three percent of
bankruptcy judges hold that § 546(e) does not apply to protect payments
made to shareholders in the context of a leveraged buyout. Certainly, the
different positions taken by bankruptcy judges and federal appellate
judges cannot be justified merely by the statutory language. Although all
judges use formal legal reasoning as a vehicle to explain the outcomes,
the difference in outcomes must mean that there are other, unarticulated
factors driving these decisions.
In Part I of this Note, I will provide a general overview of leveraged
buyouts. The discussion of how and why LBOs are implemented is
particularly relevant to the application of fraudulent transfer analysis. In
Part II, I will discuss fraudulent transfer law as defined by the
Bankruptcy Code. In Part III, I will discuss which transfers within the
LBO should be attacked under fraudulent transfer law and why; this
section will focus on the various stakes of the parties involved in the
leveraged buyout transaction. I will provide an overview of the specific
factors that bankruptcy and federal appellate judges may or may not
consider in applying § 546(e). Part IV will then more thoroughly define
§ 546(e) and its application to fraudulent transfer analysis. In Part V, I
will describe the split of interpretation of § 546(e) as demonstrated by an
empirical study. In Part VI, I will discuss the formal legal rules for the
disagreement among the bankruptcy and federal appellate judges.
Finally, in Part VII, I propose several explanations for the remarkably
divided application of the statute.
I.

What is an LBO?

A leveraged buyout (“LBO”) is a corporate acquisition that is
financed through the use of debt.5 In the most basic form of the
transaction, a purchasing entity (“Acquirer”) finances the purchase of a

3. See infra Appendix I. 12/14 (86%) appellate decisions held that § 546(e)
applied.
4. See infra Appendix I. 10/27 (63%) autonomous bankruptcy decisions held that §
546(e) applied.
5. See Anthony Michael Sabino, Applying the Law of Fraudulent Conveyances to
Bankrupt Leveraged Buyouts: The Bankruptcy Code's Increasing Leverage over Failed
LBOs, 69 N.D. L. REV. 15, 20 (1993).
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target corporation (“Target”) by using the Target’s assets to secure a loan
from a lending institution (“Lender”).6 The loan from the Lender is then
used to purchase the shares of stock from the Target’s stockholders,
thereby transferring ownership of the Target to the Acquirer.7 Through
these means, “investors convert much of the equity of the corporation
into debt, cash out the prior stockholders at a premium, and gain control
of a highly leveraged corporation.”8
The increasing popularity of the leveraged buyout structure is a
result of the financial feasibility of acquisition;9 there is a minimal capital
requirement where the majority of the purchase price is financed by
borrowing against the assets of the Target.10 Therefore, “[w]hen credit is
cheap and the economy is growing, highly leveraged buyouts represent
the optimal means by which private equity firms acquire target
companies.”11 However, as is typical of any corporation operating with a
high debt to equity ratio, even a slight change in economic conditions
can pose a significant risk of bankruptcy to the Target.12 Given the

6. See id.; see also David Gray Carlson, Leveraged Buyouts in Bankruptcy, 20 GA.
L. REV. 73, 74 (1985); Emily L. Sherwin, Creditors' Rights Against Participants in a
Leveraged Buyout, 72 MINN. L. REV. 449, 449 (1988).
7. See Sherwin, supra note 6, at 450. This structure represents the archetypical
LBO. Although there are many variations of the archetypical form, the transaction
remains substantively the same. See Neil M. Garfinkel, Note, No Way Out: Section
546(e) is No Escape for the Public Shareholder of a Failed LBO, 1991 COLUM. BUS. L.
REV. 51, 53 (1991) (“There are many variations upon this basic transaction scenario, but
in each of them, the acquired company's debt to equity ratio has increased, and its number
of shareholders has usually decreased.”).
8. Raymond J. Blackwood, Note, Applying Fraudulent Conveyance Law to
Leveraged Buyouts, 42 DUKE L.J. 340, 342 (1992).
9. See Michael Simkovic & Benjamin S. Kaminetzky, Leveraged Buyout
Bankruptcies, the Problem of Hindsight Bias, and the Credit Default Swap Solution, 2011
COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 118, 128-30 (2010); see also Samir D. Parikh, Saving Fraudulent
Transfer Law, 86 AM. BANKR. L.J. 305, 305 (2012) (noting that within the most recent
decades “[p]rivate equity firms [have come to] rely on leveraged buyouts in order to
acquire target companies.”).
10. Minimal liquidity is required where the security interest permits “borrow[ing]
an amount that represents approximately 60 to 90 percent of the purchase price.” Parikh,
supra note 9, at 311.
11. Parikh, supra note 9, at 307; see Simkovic & Kaminetzky, supra note 9, at 124
(“During the credit boom that started in 2003 and peaked in 2007, banks issued a
remarkable volume of loans and bonds, and an astounding volume of highly leveraged
transactions were financed.”).
12. See John H. Ginsberg et al., Befuddlement Betwixt Two Fulcrums: Calibrating
the Scales of Justice to Ascertain Fraudulent Transfers in Leveraged Buyouts, 19 AM.
BANKR. INST. L. REV. 71, 75 (2011) (“As the Third Circuit put it, ‘[t]he problem universal
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recent liquidity crisis13—and the corresponding credit crunch14—it is not
difficult to imagine that servicing this debt burden became difficult for
many corporations.15 For this reason, “[t]he problem universal to all
LBOs—characterized by their high debt relative to equity interest—is
that they are less able to weather temporary financial storms because
debt demands are less flexible than equity interest.”16 Arguably, the
LBO structure has caused many corporations to file for bankruptcy in
recent years.17
The leveraged buyout is a prime example of a ‘high risk, high
reward’ business transaction. Although the debt incurred as a result of
the acquisition often leaves minimal cash flow for continued Target
operations, the utility of the LBO is based on the future expected benefit
to the Acquirer rather than an immediate increase in wealth of the Target.
The Acquirer stands to profit considerably from its ability to successfully
restructure the Target—typically an underperforming or undervalued
corporation—and later sell it at a premium.18 The Acquirer maximizes
the return on its corporate knowledge and expertise by replacing Target
management, restructuring the firm’s assets, and utilizing the synergies
to all LBOs—characterized by their high debt relative to equity interest—is that they are
less able to weather temporary financial storms because debt demands are less flexible
than equity interest.’” (quoting Mellon Bank, N.A. v. Metro Commc’ns, Inc., 945 F.2d
635, 647 (3d Cir. 1991))).
13. See Michael D. Bordo, An Historical Perspective on the Crisis of 2007-2008 2
(Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 14569, 2008), available at
http://www.nber.org/papers/w14569.pdf (discussing how the international financial crisis
began with liquidity issues in the U.S.).
14. Brian Cheffins & John Armour, The Eclipse of Private Equity, 33 DEL. J. CORP.
L. 1, 1 (2008).
15. In the wake of the liquidity crisis, the number of Chapter 11 filings has
consistently increased each year. The comparative percent changes indicate 29.7%,
33.3%, and 27.4% increases for the years 2008, 2009, 2010 respectively. See Table F:
U.S. Bankruptcy Courts––Bankruptcy Cases Commenced, Terminated and Pending
During the 12-Month Periods Ending March 31, 2009 and 2010, U.S. COURTS.GOV,
http://www.uscourts.gov/uscourts/Statistics/BankruptcyStatistics/BankruptcyFilings/2010
/0310_f.pdf (last visited Apr. 11, 2014).
16. Ginsberg et al., supra note 12, at 75 (quoting Mellon Bank, 945 F.2d at 647).
17. See HEINO MEERKATT & HEINRICH LIECHTENSTEIN, BOS. CONSULTING GRP.,
GET READY FOR THE PRIVATE-EQUITY SHAKEOUT: WILL THIS BE THE NEXT SHOCK TO THE
GLOBAL
ECONOMY?
1,
3-4
(Dec.
2008),
http://www.iese.edu/en/files/PrivateEquityWhitePaper.pdf; see also Anthony Michael
Sabino, supra note 5, at 36; Nelson D. Schwartz, Corporate Debt Coming Due May
Squeeze Credit, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 16, 2010, at A1, available at
http://www.nytimes.com/2010/03/16/business/16debt.html?pagewanted=all&_r=0.
18. Carlson, supra note 6, at 79.
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between the Target and other firms owned by the Acquirer.19 “If the
corporation is able to pay off the LBO debt . . . [the Acquirer] enjoy[s]
huge profits . . . hav[ing] purchased full equity participation in a
successful company with a small expenditure of [its] own funds.”20
Therefore, in the context of the fraudulent transfer analysis, it should be
noted that it is typically the potential profitability of the Target that
motivates the acquisition, rather than actual intent to defraud.21
II.

Fraudulent Transfer Law

Given the high risk to the Target as a result of the enormous debt
burden,22 a substantial number of these acquisitions result in
bankruptcy.23 Fraudulent transfer law becomes relevant to these
corporate bankruptcies when, in light of the priority of distribution of
assets in bankruptcy, the overwhelming secured claims of the Lender
leave little to no potential of recovery for unsecured creditors.24 “The
purpose of fraudulent transfer law is to prevent a debtor from transferring
away valuable assets in exchange for less than adequate value, if the
transfer leaves insufficient assets to compensate honest creditors.”25
Therefore, where the Target “is left in inadequate financial condition
following a buyout and later fails, unpaid creditors may assert claims
against parties who participated in the buyout,” perhaps most effectively
through the use of fraudulent conveyance statutes.26 If the transactions
19. See James F. Queenan, Jr., The Collapsed Leveraged Buyout and the Trustee in
Bankruptcy, 11 CARDOZO L. REV. 1, 10 (1989); see also Myron M. Sheinfeld & David H.
Goodman, LBO: Legitimate Business Organization or Large Bankruptcy Opportunity?, 2
J. BANKR. L. & PRAC. 799, 800-01 (1993).
20. Blackwood, supra note 8, at 342.
21. See Kupetz v. Wolf, 845 F.2d 842 (9th Cir.1988) (“We cannot believe that
virtually all LBOs are designed to ‘hinder, delay, or defraud creditors.’”). As such,
fraudulent transfer analysis in this context is typically centered on constructive fraud.
However, it should be noted that actual intent to defraud, while tremendously difficult to
prove, typically defeats the § 546(e) affirmative defense. See 11 U.S.C. § 546(e) (2012)
(excluding actual fraud by reference to § 548(a)(1)(A)).
22. See Parikh, supra note 9, at 307.
23. Id. at 308; see Schwartz, supra note 17.
24. See Stephen E. Schilling, Ambiguity and Bad Policy: Should § 546(e) of the
Bankruptcy Code Be Applied to Leveraged Buyouts of Private Companies?, 9 DEPAUL
BUS. & COM. L.J. 471, 478 (2011).
25. In re Bay Plastics, Inc., 187 B.R. 315, 322 (Bankr. C.D. Cal. 1995) (citations
omitted).
26. See Sherwin, supra note 6, at 452.
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within the LBO fall within the statutory definition of a fraudulent
conveyance,27 the transactions are subject to avoidance and funds may be
brought back into the bankruptcy estate for the benefit of unsecured
creditors.28
The legal bases for avoiding the LBO transfer as a fraudulent
conveyance are embodied in the Bankruptcy Code; either directly
through the operation of § 54829 or through § 544(b),30 which permits a
Trustee31 to use state legislation, including the Uniform Fraudulent
Conveyance Act (“UFCA”), in a minority of states, and the Uniform
Fraudulent Transfer Act (“UFTA”), in a vast majority of states, to avoid
the transaction.32
Section 548 of the Bankruptcy Code permits the avoidance of both
actually fraudulent and constructively fraudulent transfers within two
years prior to the date the bankruptcy petition is filed.33 A transfer may
be avoided under § 548(a)(1)(A) where the Trustee can prove actual
fraud on the part of a party who makes a transfer or incurs an obligation
with “actual intent to hinder, delay, or defraud.”34 However, proving
actual intent can be difficult given the general business objectives of the
Acquirer in conducting the LBO.35 Alternatively, § 548(a)(1)(B)
provides an opportunity for a Trustee, on behalf of the class of unsecured
27. There is ongoing debate as to whether fraudulent conveyance law should apply
in the context of a leveraged buyout. See Blackwood, supra note 8, at 350 (“[B]ecause
fraudulent conveyance laws arose out of a simplistic and outdated sixteenth-century
setting, applying such laws to transactions as modern and complex as the LBO is wholly
inappropriate.”).
28. See Sherwin, supra note 6, at 464 (“The remedy provided to creditors, or to a
bankruptcy trustee [or debtor in possession] on creditors' behalf, is to avoid the transfer
and recover the property or its value from transferees [for the bankruptcy estate].”); see
also 11 U.S.C. § 548(a) (2012); Schilling, supra note 24, at 478.
29. 11 U.S.C. § 548.
30. Id. § 544(b).
31. In a Chapter 11 bankruptcy, the debtor in possession may exercise all the rights
of the trustee, aside from the right to receive compensation. Id. § 1107(a). “Trustee” will
hereinafter encompass both a trustee and debtor in possession.
32. A Trustee may invoke the Bankruptcy Code, relevant state law, or both. See
Garfinkel, supra note 7, at 53-56.
33. 11 U.S.C. § 548.
34. Id. § 548(a)(1)(A).
35. Proving actual fraud also entails a higher evidentiary burden. See Garfinkel,
supra note 7, at 56 (“Because of the difficulty of proving scienter, however, most trustees
have sought to avoid the leveraged buyout through the constructive fraud provisions.”).
It should, however, be noted that proof of actual fraud would render § 546(e)
inapplicable. See 11 U.S.C. § 546(e).
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creditors, to prove constructive fraud in order to avoid the transfer.36 A
transfer of property or obligation incurred is constructively fraudulent if,
inter alia, the debtor “received less than a reasonably equivalent value in
exchange for such transfer or obligation; and . . . was insolvent on the
date that such transfer was made or such obligation was incurred, or
became insolvent as a result of such transfer or obligation.”37
In addition, a Trustee can invoke state fraudulent conveyance law
under § 544(b)(1) of the Bankruptcy Code, which permits a Trustee to
“avoid any transfer of an interest of the debtor in property or any
obligation incurred by the debtor that is voidable under applicable law.”38
As in the case of § 548(a)(1)(A), proof of actual fraud under state law
requires “actual intent to hinder, delay, or defraud.”39 However, for the
same reasons stated above, actual intent is exceedingly difficult to prove.
Alternatively, proof of constructive fraud requires analysis under a twopronged test.40 Under the first prong, the Trustee must demonstrate that
the transfer was not made for “fair consideration” (under the UFCA)41 or
that it was not made for a “reasonably equivalent value” (under the
UFTA).42 Where the first prong is satisfied, the court must then
determine whether “the debtor was either (a) insolvent at the time of the
transaction or rendered insolvent by the transaction,43 or (b) left with
36. Id. § 548(a)(1)(B).
37. Id.
38. Id. § 544(b)(1). But cf. In re Lyondell Chem. Co., 503 B.R. 348, 355 (Bankr.
S.D.N.Y. 2014) (holding that § 546(e) does not apply to lawsuits brought under state
fraudulent transfer laws).
39. See UNIF. FRAUDULENT TRANSFER ACT § 4(a)(1), 7A U.L.A. 58 (2006) (internal
quotation marks omitted).
40. See Kevin J. Liss, Note, Fraudulent Conveyance Law and Leveraged Buyouts,
87 COLUM. L. REV. 1491, 1497 (1987).
41. See UNIF. FRAUDULENT CONVEYANCE ACT § 3, 7A U.L.A. 277 (2006). The
National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws no longer publishes the
UFCA. However, the basic structure and approach of the UFCA are preserved in the
UFTA. Only five states (including New York) still utilize the UFCA. See, e.g., N.Y.
DEBT. & CRED. LAW §§ 270-81 (McKinney 2014); see also Blackwood, supra note 8, at
362-63 (Under the UFCA fair consideration analysis, where the “purpose of fraudulent
conveyance law is to protect creditors from unwarranted depletion of the debtor's assets,
the sufficiency of the consideration is viewed from the perspective of the LBO target's
creditors.”). For the New York provision for “fair consideration” see, N.Y. DEBT. &
CRED. LAW § 272.
42. See UNIF. FRAUDULENT TRANSFER ACT § 4(a)(2), 7A U.L.A. 58 (2006).
43. See Liss, supra note 40, at 1497 & n.42 (citing UNIF. FRAUDULENT
CONVEYANCE ACT § 4, 7A U.L.A. 474 (1985); UNIF. FRAUDULENT TRANSFER ACT § 5(a),
7A U.L.A. 657 (1985)).
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unreasonably small capital.”44 Where both prongs have been met, the
transfer can be avoided and the funds brought back into the bankruptcy
estate.45
III. Which Are the Alleged Fraudulent Transfers Subject to Avoidance?
A. Which Transfers Should be Attacked?
The analysis of this multiparty transaction within the scope of
fraudulent conveyance law is especially difficult where fraudulent
conveyance statutes were drafted to address a standard two-party
transaction.46 Within the context of an LBO, the application of
fraudulent transfer law requires a determination of which transfers
should be avoided, and therefore recovered by the estate for the benefit
of creditors. Although this analysis may be affected by the specific
structure of the LBO,47 courts have found that certain payments made by
a debtor either to the Lender or to the selling shareholder may be
avoided.48 Therefore, the two major foci of the fraudulent transfer
analysis within the archetypical leveraged buyout include the lendertarget mutual obligations and payments to selling shareholders.
In the most basic form of the LBO, the Lender typically makes a
loan in exchange for a security interest in the assets of the Target, as
directed by the Acquirer. Where the loan funds are deposited directly
with the Target, the Target appears to have incurred a clear obligation (to
repay the loan), and at first glance, appears to have received a reasonably
equivalent value (the loan proceeds). However, both the Target’s
assumption of the obligation to repay the loan and the Target’s transfer
of a security interest in its assets to the Lender are potentially fraudulent
transfers.49 Although the Target’s assets have been pledged to secure
44. Id. at 1497 & n.43 (citing UNIF. FRAUDULENT CONVEYANCE ACT § 5, 7A U.L.A.
504 (1985); UNIF. FRAUDULENT TRANSFER ACT § 4(a)(2)(i), 7A U.L.A. 652 (1985)).
45. Id. at 1497.
46. 11 U.S.C. § 548(a)(1)(B) (2012); see also Daniel J. Merrett & John H. Chase,
Safe Harbor Supernova: Is Section 546(e)’s Stellar Protection of Private LBO
Transactions About to Burn Out? 21 J. BANKR. L. & PRAC. 3 Art. 1, n.161 (2012).
47. For further discussion of this topic, see infra Part VII.B.
48. See Sabino, supra note 5, at 26. For a discussion of the collapsing doctrine, see
infra Part VII.B.
49. There is also the argument that payments to selling shareholders may be
deemed fraudulent on the theory that Target management authorized the overpayment for
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repayment of the loan, the loan funds received immediately flow through
the Target to selling shareholders; the Target does not beneficially retain
the loan proceeds.50 Rather, the Target appears to act as a mere conduit
as distributor of funds to the selling shareholders at the direction of the
Acquirer. The implications of this structured transaction will be
discussed in Part V, infra.
B. Why Should the Transfer be Avoided?
The purpose of applying fraudulent transfer law in order to employ
the avoidance powers is to “level the playing field among similarly
situated creditors[,] . . . to maximize the amount of property available to
a debtor’s general unsecured creditors[,]”51 and to facilitate the success
of the reorganization. However, the question then becomes, why level
the playing field among creditors? Why protect the unsecured creditors
at all? This is the root of the divide between bankruptcy judges and
federal appellate judges and will be discussed in Parts VI and VII, infra.
However, to understand the arguments that perpetuate this divide, one
must first consider the circumstances of the players involved in, and
affected by, the LBO.
1. Target Shareholders
First, recall that prior to the leveraged buyout the Target was
identified by the Acquirer as an underperforming corporation. It seems
inequitable that the Target shareholders should receive priority in
corporate distribution when they would have been residual claimants in
the bankruptcy in the absence of the LBO. Furthermore, these
shareholders have not only been paid for their shares, but also have been
paid at a premium despite having assumed absolutely no risk.52 “The
selling shareholders receive their price at closing and have no continuing
stake in the target, and thus no exposure to risk of leverage-induced

outstanding shares (at a premium) despite the apparent financial infeasibility, evidenced
by the resulting bankruptcy. See Parikh, supra note 9, at 308. This argument will not be
explored in this Note.
50. See Carlson, supra note 6, at 75.
51. Merrett & Chase, supra note 46.
52. See Queenan, supra note 19, at 5.
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insolvency.”53 Therefore, there is an impropriety where, “in anticipation
of a liquidation, shareholders extract value from the company at a time
when the general creditors have not been paid.”54
2. Secured Creditor
Lenders, on another hand, are protected by their security interests
and have “voluntarily assume[d] credit-risk in pursuit of commensurate
interest rates providing a favorable risk-adjusted return.”55 Lenders can
“scrutinize the transaction before entering into it[] . . . [and] respond by
increasing the price—the interest rate—charged for credit because of the
increased risk of fraudulent conveyance attack.”56 Therefore, the Lender
is in the best position to foresee the bankruptcy where it has the
opportunity to analyze the current financial state of the Target57 prior to
issuance of the loan. The Lender may then take corresponding
precautions, such as adjusting the interest rate and structuring the
transaction to protect its own interests in the event of a bankruptcy.
Conveniently enough, the security interest in the collateral provides the
Lender with priority of distribution in the bankruptcy estate.58
3. Acquirer
The Acquirer obviously draws various financial benefits from the
LBO where the potential profit is what motivates the acquisition. Where
the Acquiring management is able to manage successfully the operations
of the newly acquired Target so as to produce a profit, debt can be paid
off and Acquiring management enjoys a corresponding increase in the
value of its equity.59 Additionally, where the “the buyout dramatically
53. Ginsberg et al., supra note 12, at 76.
54. Carlson, supra note 6, at 85.
55. Ginsberg et al., supra note 12, at 76.
56. Liss, supra note 40, at 1513.
57. Depending on the structure of the transaction, the Lender may also analyze the
financial state of the Acquirer as well. See generally Carlson, supra note 6, at 81-83
(discussing different forms of LBOs).
58. 11 U.S.C. § 507 (2012); see also Irina V. Fox, Settlement Payment Exception to
Avoidance Powers in Bankruptcy: An Unsettling Method of Avoiding Recovery from
Shareholders of Failed Closely Held Company LBOs, 84 AM. BANKR. L.J. 571, 575
(2010).
59. See Ginsberg et al., supra note 12, at 77.
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narrows the ownership base, any appreciation in the company’s equity is
thereby divided among fewer parties.”60 In the event that Acquiring
management is not able to successfully produce a profit as a result of the
overwhelming debt burden, the resulting loss is limited by the fact that
the financing for the LBO came from a loan secured by the assets of the
Target; little to no equity necessarily has been lost.61 The “worst case
scenario for [Acquiring management] is that they will lose their market
investment in the LBO if they are unable to sell their position before the
[T]arget’s failure.”62
4. Unsecured Creditor
Therefore, unsecured creditors assume the risk of the bankruptcy
associated with the LBO. This is the definition of being unsecured, and
therefore holds true whether there is an LBO or not. However, where the
positive net worth of the Target has been reduced by the secured debt,
the Lender’s priority secured liens additionally minimize, if not
eliminate, the recovery potential for these unsecured creditors. Of
course, there are both sophisticated and unsophisticated unsecured
creditors. Yet, while the sophisticated unsecured creditors typically
manage bankruptcy risk by charging risk adjusted interest rates or
negotiating bond covenants, unsophisticated, unsecured creditors have
little knowledge or access to information, and ultimately, have no
bargaining power.63 Where the majority of unsecured creditors are
unsophisticated, the application of fraudulent conveyance law may be
especially appropriate where these individuals “are poorly positioned to
limit such risk, not being party to the LBO and being unshielded by any
good proxy among the parties.”64
Under the Bankruptcy Code and state law, courts have an effective

60. Parikh, supra note 9, at 313 (citing Garfinkel, supra note 7, at 52-53); see also
Queenan, supra note 19, at 1.
61. “Most important to the acquiring group . . . is the gradual increase in their
equity in the target. As the income stream repays the debt, the controlling group's
investment becomes less and less leveraged.” Garfinkel, supra note 7, at 53. However,
the inference is that where the income stream is unable to repay the massive debt incurred
by the Target, as evidenced by the resulting bankruptcy, the Acquirers have little to no
equity to lose.
62. Fox, supra note 58, at 580.
63. See Liss, supra note 40, at 1512.
64. Ginsberg et. al., supra note 12, at 75.
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tool to avoid fraudulent transfers in order to protect the interests of
creditors of the bankruptcy estate. There is substantial case law that
demonstrates that courts have used these tools frequently to maximize
the recovery for the estate in liquidation and reorganization. Yet
remarkably, the Bankruptcy Code includes a provision that leads some
judges to hold that fraudulent transfer law is inapplicable to fraudulent
transfers made in the context of an LBO.
IV. Settlement Payment Exception
Section 546(e) of the Bankruptcy Code has changed the application
of fraudulent transfer law in the context of an LBO. Within the past few
decades,65 what was once “a relatively obscure section of the U.S.
Bankruptcy Code”66 is now a commonplace defense to creditor suits
known as the ‘settlement payment exception.’ The ‘settlement payment
exception’ exempts from avoidance various transfers made during the
buyout by precluding a Trustee from using § 548, or state law (the UFCA
or UFTA) through § 544(b) to recover property for the benefit of the
estate. Section 546(e) provides that:
(e) Notwithstanding sections 544 . . . 548(a)(1)(B),
and 548(b) of this title, the trustee may not avoid a
transfer that is a . . . settlement payment, as defined
in section 101 or 741 of this title, made by or to (or
for the benefit of) a commodity broker, forward
contract merchant, stockbroker, financial institution,
financial participant, or securities clearing agency, or
that is a transfer made by or to (or for the benefit of)
a commodity broker, forward contract merchant,
stockbroker,
financial
institution,
financial
participant, or securities clearing agency, in
connection with a securities contract, as defined in
section 741(7), commodity contract, as defined in
761(4), or forward contract, that is made before the
commencement of the case, except under section

65. See Schilling, supra note 24, at 473.
66. Garfinkel, supra note 7, at 51.
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548(a)(1)(A) of this title.67
Recall from Part III that the potentially fraudulent transfers subject
to avoidance include the Target’s assumption of the obligation to repay
the loan, the Target’s transfer of a security interest in its assets to the
Lender, and the contemporaneous payments made to Target
shareholders.68 What this means is that these transfers may be shielded
from avoidance where any of these transfers are held to constitute a
settlement payment made by (and to) a financial institution or a transfer
by (and to) a financial institution in connection with a securities
contract.69 As a result, the major difficulty posed by § 546(e), at least in
terms of legal formalism, results from two very different interpretations
of which transfers constitute ‘settlement payments’ and what enterprises
come within the statutory term, ‘financial institution.’
The statutory definition of ‘settlement payment’ is exceptionally
vague; it is defined only by reference to §§ 101 and 741, neither of which
provides much more clarity.70 Section 101(51A) defines settlement
payment as “a preliminary settlement payment, a partial settlement
67. 11 U.S.C. § 546 (2012) (emphasis added). The judicial interpretation of
“settlement payment” differs slightly from the statutory definition and suggests that a
“settlement payment” means “the transfer of cash or securities made to complete a
securities transaction.” In re Resorts Int’l, Inc., 181 F.3d 505, 514-15 (3d Cir. 1999)
(citation omitted).
68. See supra Part III.
Where the LBO structure requires that such
contemporaneous payments be made to the shareholders in order to effectuate the
acquisition, courts “refuse[] to characterize the loans and the buyout as separate
transactions.” Matthew T. Kirby et al., Fraudulent Conveyance Concerns in Leveraged
Buyout Lending, 43 BUS. LAW 27, 42 (1987) (“The transactions were treated as one
because ‘[t]he two exchanges were part of one integrated transaction[.]’” (quoting United
States v. Tabor Realty Corp., 803 F.2d 1288, 1302 (3d Cir. 1986))). “[T]he payment to
the shareholders by the buyer of the corporation is deemed a fraudulent conveyance
because in exchange for the money the shareholders received they provided no value to
the corporation but merely increased its debt and by doing so pushed it over the brink.”
Schilling, supra note 24, at 478 (quoting Boyer v. Crown Stock Distribution, Inc., 587
F.3d 787, 792 (7th Cir. 2009)) (emphasis added). The LBO is typically challenged on
fraudulent conveyance grounds where funds were merely passed through the debtor, to
former shareholders. Therefore, the fraudulent transfer claims are often brought against
former shareholders, but can also be brought against officers and directors, lenders, and
financial advisors. The issue then becomes whether there was actual or constructive
intent to defraud. Sherwin, supra note 6, at 452.
69. See, e.g., In re MacMenamin's Grill Ltd., 450 B.R. 414, 419 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y.
2011).
70. Zahn v. Yucaipa Capital Fund, 218 B.R. 656, 675 (Bankr. D.R.I. 1998)
(suggesting that the definition of settlement payment is both “circular and cryptic”).
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payment, an interim settlement payment, a settlement payment on
account, a final settlement payment, a net settlement payment, or any
other similar payment commonly used in the forward contract trade.”71
Section 741(8), defines ‘settlement payment’ as “a preliminary
settlement payment, a partial settlement payment, an interim settlement
payment, a settlement payment on account, a final settlement payment,
or any other similar payment commonly used in the securities trade.”72
As various courts have noted, this “definition of ‘settlement payment’ is
frustratingly self-referential—essentially stating that a ‘settlement
payment’ is a ‘settlement payment.’”73
The definition of ‘financial institution’ is also subject to debate,
despite having a less circular statutory definition. Section 101(22) of the
Bankruptcy Code defines a ‘financial institution’ to include all
“commercial or savings banks . . . savings and loan association[s] [and] .
. . federally-insured credit union[s],” as well as other entities.74
Similarly, Black’s Law Dictionary defines a financial institution as “[a]
business, organization, or other entity that manages money, credit, or
capital, such as a bank, credit union, savings-and-loan association,
securities broker or dealer, pawnbroker, or investment company.”75 The
challenge is that the definition of ‘financial institution’ is not subject to
any explicit limitation.
The conflict between bankruptcy judges and federal appellate
judges arises because the definition of ‘settlement payment’ and the
definition of ‘financial institution’ are not explicitly limited. The
absence of definitional clarity has been an issue for to the courts to
reconcile—or not reconcile—in the interpretation of § 546(e)’s
application to LBOs.
V. Bankruptcy Judges v. Federal Appellate Judges
Since 1985, beginning with In re International Gold Bullion
Exchange, Inc.,76 sixty-three percent77 of bankruptcy judges have
71. 11 U.S.C. § 101(51A) (emphasis added).
72. Id. § 741(8) (emphasis added).
73. In re MacMenamin's, 450 B.R. at 418 (citing In re QSI Holdings, Inc., 571 F.3d
545 (6th Cir. 2009)).
74. 11 U.S.C. § 101(22).
75. BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 706 (9th ed. 2009) (emphasis added).
76. 53 B.R. 660 (Bankr. S.D. Fla. 1985); see also infra Appendix I.
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interpreted § 546(e) narrowly, thus limiting § 546(e)’s exemption from
avoidance. That is, bankruptcy judges have consistently held that §
546(e) does not protect payments made to shareholders in the context of
an LBO. Conversely, since 1990, beginning with Kaiser Steel Corp. v.
Charles Schwab & Co.,78 eighty-six percent79 of federal appellate judges
have interpreted § 546(e) broadly. That is, federal appellate judges have
consistently held that § 546(e) prevents a Trustee from avoiding these
payments.80 The disagreement among courts in determining whether the
transfer of funds in the context of an LBO is considered a ‘settlement
payment’81 is obviously not random. Where some judges consistently
interpret the same statute in one way and other judges consistently
interpret the same statute in an opposite way, all the while using the same
canons of statutory interpretation, there is a need for explanation.
A. The Study
Given the radically different treatment of § 546(e) by bankruptcy
judges and federal appellate judges, I conducted an empirical study to
determine the extent of this trend based on the court opinions within each
federal circuit. My goal was first to describe this trend and then to
explain why these judges have adopted such radically different positions
on this issue. I analyzed the judicial decisions construing § 546(e)
between 1985 and 2013,82 although not necessarily in the context of
77. See infra Appendix I. 17/27 (63%) autonomous bankruptcy court decisions
held § 546(e) does NOT apply.
78. 913 F.2d 846 (10th Cir. 1990).
79. See infra Appendix I. 12/14 (86%) appellate court decisions held § 546(e)
applies.
80. “The Second Circuit recently reiterated that it follows the Third, Sixth, and
Eighth Circuits, in holding that any transfer to a financial institution may qualify for
protection, even if it is only serving as a conduit or intermediary.” In re Tougher Indus.,
Inc., Nos. 06-12960. 07-10022, 2013 WL 5592902, at *5 (Bankr. N.D.N.Y. Oct. 10,
2013) (footnote omitted).
81. Fox, supra note 58, at 574 (“[T]he only common point in all circuits is that a
trustee cannot recover from the market intermediaries.”).
82. “In the 1980's, easy credit and the availability of junk bond financing created a
frenzy of leveraged buyouts . . . .” William C. Rand, Comment, In re Kaiser Steel
Corporation: Does Section 546(e) of the Bankruptcy Code Apply to a Fraudulent
Conveyance Made in the Form of an LBO Payment?, 19 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 87, 87
(1991). For statistics on mergers and acquisitions from 1980-88, see U.S. BUREAU OF THE
CENSUS, STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF THE UNITED STATES: 1990 534 tbl.883 (1990),
available at http://www2.census.gov/prod2/statcomp/documents/1990-05.pdf.
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leveraged buyouts.83 I will explain the reasons for the differing
interpretations in Parts VI and VII, infra.
B. Methodology
For purposes of this study, I determined that § 546(e) addresses
three types of transfers: 1) “a transfer that is a margin payment”; 2) a
transfer that is a “settlement payment, . . . made by or to (or for the
benefit of) a commodity broker, forward contract merchant, stockbroker,
financial institution, financial participant, or securities clearing agency”;
and 3) “a transfer made by or to (or for the benefit of) a commodity
broker, forward contract merchant, stockbroker, financial institution,
financial participant, or securities clearing agency in connection with a
securities contract, . . . a commodity contract, . . . or forward contract.”84
My study focused on a subset of the second type of transfer: a transfer
that is a “settlement payment made by or to (or for the benefit of) a
financial institution.”85 I excluded those decisions involving the first and
third types of transfers referenced above.
I conducted this study by generating a search for all cases
construing the § 546(e) ‘settlement payment exception.’86 In order to
ensure meaningful results, I analyzed only those decisions that dealt with
the merits of fraudulent conveyance actions and the application of §
546(e) in cases in which there was a controversy as to whether the
transfer in question was a ‘settlement payment’ made by or to a
‘financial institution.’
Therefore, I excluded decisions involving
procedural matters and decisions in connection with procedural phases
such as motions to dismiss and reviews of summary judgment. Finally, I
excluded those decisions involving any transfers made by or to an
enterprise that would more obviously be considered a financial
institution within the securities industry, including banks, brokerage
83. The genesis of the study was inspired by the divergence of interpretation
regarding the application of § 546(e) to protect the payments made to shareholders in the
context of a leveraged buyout. From this analysis, a more prominent trend emerged,
thereby inspiring a more generalized study. However, the resulting explanation of the
data is equally applicable in the leveraged buyout context.
84. 11 U.S.C. § 546(e) (2012).
85. Id.
86. I generated a search on the legal search engines, Westlaw Next and LexisNexis,
using the search terms: “11 U.S.C. 546(e),” “section 546(e),” and “settlement payment
exception” within all state and federal courts.
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firms and clearing agencies governed by SIPA87 regulations. 88
This methodology provided a sample size of fourteen appellate
court decisions and thirty-eight bankruptcy court decisions. However, of
the thirty-eight bankruptcy court decisions, I excluded eleven nonautonomous decisions. The exclusion of these decisions was guided by
the principle that bankruptcy courts are legally bound by both district and
federal appellate court decisions within the same circuit that are factually
on point. Therefore, I use “autonomous” to describe an opinion issued
by a bankruptcy judge where the judge was not bound by precedent. This
was determined by classifying the holdings into two groups. The first
group of autonomous bankruptcy court decisions includes cases of first
impression because no prior appellate court decisions had been rendered
within the circuit. The second group is comprised of those cases in
which the bankruptcy judge held he or she was not bound by the
precedent set by the district and federal appellate courts within that
circuit. Analysis of both groups suggests that twenty-seven of the
The eleven nonbankruptcy court decisions are autonomous.89
autonomous decisions were those decisions issued by bankruptcy judges
in which the judge was, willingly or unwillingly,90 bound by precedent.91
Although bankruptcy judges have issued the decisions, the decisions are
not pertinent because they merely reiterate the binding rationale of their
federal appellate court. I excluded these decisions from my analysis
because they do not contribute meaningfully to the data regarding the
interpretational split.
The purpose for refining the data is evidenced by the results in the
Third Circuit, for example.92 After In re Resorts International, Inc.93

87. Securities Investor Protection Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 78aaa-78lll (2012).
88. The term ‘financial institution’ is extremely open-ended. See supra Part IV.
Therefore, such exclusion was admittedly a more subjective aspect of the study.
89. See infra Appendix I.
90. One could argue that what looks like a non-autonomous decision is actually an
autonomous decision because the bankruptcy judge has chosen to be bound by precedent.
This would suggest that all decisions are in fact autonomous and precedent is
meaningless, particularly where distinguishing facts is subject to judicial discretion. See,
e.g., Jerome Frank, What Courts Do in Fact, 26 ILL. L. REV. 645, 660 (1931) (discussing,
hypothetically, how two judges may understand what the objective facts are). This would
fall in line with the radical indeterminist theory. See, e.g., Anthony D’Amato, Pragmatic
Indeterminacy, 85 NW. U. L. REV. 148 (1990). I, however, am not willing to say that
precedent is meaningless here.
91. See infra Appendix I.
92. See infra Appendix I, Third Circuit.
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was decided in 1999, the subsequent bankruptcy court decisions in that
circuit, which could not sufficiently distinguish the facts, were bound by
the decision94 and held that § 546(e) applied to protect payments made to
shareholders. The general trend in the Third Circuit following In re
Resorts International, Inc. highlights the purpose in designating certain
decisions as non-autonomous; this demonstrates that the bankruptcy
judges are not always able to render a decision based on their own
interpretation of the scope of § 546(e).
C. The Results
The raw data are rather revealing. The explanatory percentages are
based on a total of fourteen appellate court decisions and twenty-seven
autonomous bankruptcy court decisions. Twelve of the fourteen, or
eighty-six percent of, appellate judges held that § 546(e) exempted the
debtor’s transfers from avoidance, holding that these transfers constituted
settlement payments.95 By comparison, ten of the twenty-seven, a mere
thirty-seven percent of, bankruptcy judges autonomously exempted these
transfers from avoidance, holding that these transfers constituted
settlement payments.96 Thus, the disagreement among courts in
determining whether the transfer of funds in the context of an LBO is
considered a ‘settlement payment’ made by (or to) a ‘financial
institution’ is obviously not random. One must ask the glaring question
that remains, however: why is there a disagreement at all? I will provide
several rational explanations in Parts VI and VII, infra.
VI. Does Legal Formalism Explain the Data?
In our common law tradition, when the same issue of law is posed
to two different courts, the result should be the same in the absence of
glaring error; “[a] single answer in most, if not all, cases can be deduced

93. 181 F.3d 505 (3d Cir. 1999).
94. This is the principle of stare decisis. 20 AM. JUR. 2D Courts § 129 (2013); see
infra Appendix I (listing the Third Circuit cases decided after In re Resorts International,
Inc.).
95. See infra Appendix I. Twelve of the fourteen appellate decisions held that §
546(e) applied.
96. See infra Appendix I. Ten of the twenty-seven autonomous bankruptcy
decisions held that § 546(e) applied.
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by judges who are able to restrict themselves to the rules and to avoid
making any moral or public policy decisions in rendering judgments.”97
Therefore, it is significant when bankruptcy judges consistently interpret
§ 546(e) narrowly and federal appellate judges consistently interpret §
546(e) broadly.
Legal formalism “asserts that legal disputes are resolvable solely by
recourse to legal rules and principles, and to the facts of each particular
dispute.”98 Where judges are engaged in interpreting the same statute
and have received the same formal training in the same analytical
methods, it becomes clear that the ‘facts of each particular dispute’ must
serve as the justification for this departure. Judges are bound only if a
case presents the same legally relevant facts as the precedent, but of
course, there is no meta-rule that informs a judge of what facts are
legally relevant. As a result, almost every case can be distinguished.
The question is why judges will distinguish particular cases at all. There
are several possible explanations for this. The difference between the
treatment of fraudulent transfers and the application of § 546(e) is a
product of a number of variables which, operating in combination,
explain the divergence. Under the pretense of legal formalism, judges
cite the legal arguments of plain meaning and congressional intent as
justification for the holdings.99 However, the inconsistent application of
the canons of interpretation suggests that something else is driving these
decisions; legal formalism does not explain the outcomes.
A. Plain Meaning: It Says What It Says
Bankruptcy judges hold that the plain meaning of § 546(e) does not
necessarily exempt private stock transactions—including payments to
selling shareholders—from avoidance as constructive fraudulent
97. Michael P. Ambrosio, Legal Realism, NEW JERSEY LAW., Oct. 2000, at 30. See
generally Edward Rubin, The Real Formalists, the Real Realists, and What They Tell Us
About Judicial Decision Making and Legal Education, 109 MICH. L. REV. 863 (2011)
(reviewing BRIAN Z. TAMANAHA, BEYOND THE FORMALIST-REALIST DIVIDE: THE ROLE OF
POLITICS IN JUDGING (2010)).
98. Ambrosio, supra note 97, at 30.
99. See Schilling, supra note 24, at 484; see also Fox, supra note 58, at 573 (“The
application of the settlement payment exception is problematic because of the
contradiction between the broad literal wording of the exception and its narrow
legislative purpose. The language of the statute is quite expansive and arguably exempts
all stock transactions from avoidance, while the legislative history indicates that the
statute meant to protect only the market for publicly traded stock.”).
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transfers.100 As applied to an LBO, “the key language in § 546(e) is that
the [T]rustee may not avoid a transfer that is a ‘settlement payment’
made ‘by or to’ a ‘financial institution.’”101 The textual support for
bankruptcy judges’ refusal to apply the settlement payment exception to
this type of private stock transfer is based on their interpretation of the
plain meaning of the statute—the “belief that the Bankruptcy Code’s
definition of ‘settlement payment’ is limited by the phrase ‘or any other
similar payment commonly used in securities trade’ that appears at the
end of Bankruptcy Code section 741(8).”102 Bankruptcy judges hold that
the contemporaneous payments made to selling shareholders during the
effectuation of the LBO are not payments commonly used in the
securities trade, and thus, that § 546(e) does not protect the transfers to
shareholders from being voided as fraudulent transfers; to hold as such
“would . . . deprive the [statutory] definition of meaning.”103
Additionally, § 101(22) of the Bankruptcy Code defines ‘financial
institution’ entities as, inter alia, including all commercial and savings
banks, savings and loan associations, and federally insured credit
unions.104 Aside from being broad, and far from plain, this language
provides for the “mere conduit” argument, encouraging the running of
money through ‘financial institutions’ as a mere means of protecting
these payments to shareholders, which are not commonly used in the
securities trade, from avoidance.105
On the other hand, federal appellate judges, applying the same
canons of statutory interpretation,106 hold that § 546(e) has a different
100. See In re MacMenamin's Grill Ltd., 450 B.R. 414, 419 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2011)
(collecting cases); In re Grand Eagle Companies, Inc., 288 B.R. 484, 495 (Bankr. N.D.
Ohio 2003) (“[Target] will not be permitted to merely cite to that technically drafted
statutory protection mechanism to summarily defeat the Committee's claims.”).
101. Schilling, supra note 24, at 490 (quoting 11 U.S.C. § 546(e) (2012)).
102. In re MacMenamin’s, 450 B.R. at 421 (emphasis added) (quoting 11 U.S.C. §
546(e)); see also 11 U.S.C. § 741(8).
103. In re Norstan Apparel Shops, Inc., 367 B.R. 68, 76 (Bankr. E.D.N.Y. 2007).
104. 11 U.S.C. § 101(22).
105. See, e.g., In re Munford, Inc., 98 F.3d 604, 610 (11th Cir. 1996) (“But the
bank here was nothing more than an intermediary or conduit. Funds were deposited with
the bank and when the bank received the shares from the selling shareholders, it sent
funds to them in exchange. The bank never acquired a beneficial interest in either the
funds or the shares.”).
106. See Lamie v. U. S. Trustee, 540 U.S. 526, 534 (2004) (“It is well established
that ‘when the statute's language is plain, the sole function of the courts—at least where
the disposition required by the text is not absurd—is to enforce it according to its terms.’”
(quoting Hartford Underwriters Ins. Co. v. Union Planters Bank, N.A., 530 U.S. 1, 6
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plain meaning than the plain meaning described by the bankruptcy
judges.107 This plain meaning protects all parties to the transaction at the
expense of unsecured creditors because payments to shareholders within
the context of an LBO are ‘commonly used in the securities trade.’108 In
addition, most federal appellate judges oppose the “mere conduit”
argument articulated by the bankruptcy courts.109 These judges hold that
the language of § 546(e) contains no requirement that a financial
institution acquire a beneficial interest in the funds it handles.110 This
plain meaning permits the parties to run money through ‘financial
institutions’ to prevent the possibility of avoidance if they so choose.
Where the “term ‘plain meaning’ implies that something is apparent
on its face and incapable of reasonable disagreement,”111 it becomes
clear that the plain meaning of § 546(e) is less than plain and that other
factors contribute to this divided interpretation.
B. Congressional Intent: But What Does It Mean?
Where a statute has no plain meaning, or yields absurd results,
judges turn to Congressional intent to give meaning to the statutory
language.112 The legislative history of § 546(e) suggests that Congress
enacted the statute in 1982 to “minimize the displacement caused in the

(2000))).
107. See, e.g., Contemporary Industries Corp. v. Frost, 564 F.3d 981, 986 (8th Cir.
2009) (“[T]he relevant text has a sufficiently plain and unambiguous meaning. We agree
with our sister circuits that § 741(8) was intended to sweep broadly. Thus, we conclude
the term ‘settlement payment,’ as used therein, encompasses most transfers of money or
securities made to complete a securities transaction.” (citations omitted)).
108. See In re QSI Holdings, Inc., 571 F.3d 545, 550 (6th Cir. 2009) (“[N]othing in
the statutory language indicates that Congress sought to limit that protection to publicly
traded securities.”).
109. Compare In re Quebecor World (USA) Inc., 480 B.R. 468, 476-77 (2012) (“At
least three courts of appeals, however, have expressly rejected Munford, holding that ‘the
plain language of § 546(e) simply does not require a ‘financial institution’ to have a
‘beneficial interest’ in the transferred funds.’”) (collecting cases), with In re Munford,
Inc., 98 F.3d at 610 (applying the “mere conduit” argument).
110. 11 U.S.C. § 546(e) (2012).
111. Schilling, supra note 24, at 516.
112. “[W]here the plain language, even if literally applicable, would yield absurd
results at odds with the statutory design, courts may look beyond the printed word to the
law as a whole and its purposes and policy, so as to determine what particular legislative
intent may apply.” In re Adler, Coleman Clearing Corp., 263 B.R. 406, 478 (S.D.N.Y.
2001) (citing Massachusetts v. Morash, 490 U.S. 107, 115 (1989)).
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commodities and securities markets in the event of a major bankruptcy
affecting those industries.”113 The rationale behind preventing the
avoidance power of a Trustee by means of the settlement payment
exception “was to prevent the bankruptcy of one party in the
commodities clearance and settlement [system] from spreading to other
parties,” thereby threatening the collapse of the entire market. 114
However, “[a]t the time of the 1981 Subcommittee Hearings, leveraged
buyouts were . . . obscure and occurred infrequently;”115 the
repercussions of preventing the avoidance powers of a Trustee in the
context of an LBO were not yet considered. Therefore, there is little
statutory guidance on the application of § 546(e) to prevent avoidance of
payments to shareholders in the context of an LBO.116
Where bankruptcy judges hold that § 546(e) is not plain in meaning,
they view the legislative history of § 546(e) as highly relevant to the
statute’s application in the context of private stock transaction,117 noting
that “[w]here a securities transaction is entirely private, such as in an
LBO of a privately held company . . . it is difficult to see how the
purpose of protecting the national clearance and settlement system has
any relationship to that LBO.”118 Bankruptcy court opinions typically
reflect the notion that the settlement payment exception, as applied to
LBOs, serves no purpose in preventing “the domino effect”119 within the
commodities and securities markets.
In the absence of plain meaning, federal appellate judges also turn
to congressional intent. In doing so, these judges hold “that the broad
definition of settlement payment further[s] a policy of protecting
113. H.R. REP. NO. 97-420, at 1 (1982), reprinted in 1982 U.S.C.C.A.N. 583, 583.
114. Garfinkel, supra note 7, at 61-62.
115. Parikh, supra note 9, at 337.
116. See id. at 332 (citing H.R. REP. NO. 97-420).
117. See, e.g., Buckley v. Goldman, Sachs & Co., No. Civ.A.02-CV-11497RGS,
2005 WL 1206865, at *7 (D. Mass. May 20, 2005) (“The object that Congress sought to
accomplish by enacting § 546(e) was to protect the operation of the security industry's
clearance and settlement system. That interest is not furthered in any meaningful sense
by bringing an LBO like the one at issue in this case under the exemption of § 546(e)
simply because funds fortuitously passed through financial institutions on their way into
the hands of the defendants.”); see also In re MacMenamin's Grill Ltd., 450 B.R. 414,
419-20 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2011); In re Norstan Apparel Shops, Inc., 367 B.R. 68, 76
(Bankr. E.D.N.Y. 2007) (interpreting H.R. REP. NO. 97–420).
118. Schilling, supra note 24, at 492.
119. Bankruptcy of Commodity and Securities Brokers: Hearings Before the
Subcomm. on Monopolies and Commercial Law of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 97th
Cong. 203 (1981) (statement of Edmund Schroeder); see also H.R. REP. NO. 97-420, at 1.
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securities markets from harm that might occur if bankruptcy [T]rustees
have the power to unwind settled securities transactions;”120 that
“interpreting ‘settlement payment’ to include the transfer of
consideration in an LBO is consistent with the way ‘settlement’ is
defined in the securities industry . . . [as] ‘the completion of a securities
transaction.’”121 In addition, the federal appellate judges disagree with
the interpretation put forth by the bankruptcy judges based on the
supposition that “Congress could have addressed the breadth of § 546(e)
and the definition of settlement payment, but it has not done so.”122
Where “[i]t remains ambiguous what exactly the settlement
payment exception [must] shield in order to protect the markets,”123 it is
clear that plain meaning and congressional intent are not determinative.
There must be something else that perpetuates the divide between
bankruptcy and federal appellate judges. Legal formalism does not
explain the data.

VII. So, What Does Explain the Data? Articulating the Unarticulated
Where judges are to reason deductively from the same formal
rules—plain meaning and congressional intent—and consider the same
set of facts, legal formalism suggests that the outcomes should be the
same. Yet, although judges say, by means of written legal opinion, that
they are merely interpreting the statute,124 the difference of
interpretations is remarkable. Where bankruptcy judges have adopted a
pragmatic analysis, federal appellate judges instead have adopted a
purely textual analysis. The question then becomes, why? I see three
possible explanations for this divide: the specialization of the bankruptcy
courts, the recognition that bankruptcy courts are acting as courts of
equity, and the attitudinal differences towards judicial regulation of the
120. Schilling, supra note 24, at 488.
121. Kaiser Steel Corp. v. Charles Schwab & Co., Inc., 913 F.2d 846, 849 (10th
Cir. 1990) (quoting A. PESSIN & J. ROSS, WORDS OF WALL STREET: 2000 INVESTMENT
TERMS DEFINED 227 (1983)).
122. Schilling, supra note 24, at 488 (citing In re Quality Stores, Inc., 355 B.R.
629, 634 (Bankr. W.D. Mich. 2006)).
123. Fox, supra note 58, at 587.
124. See Frank, supra note 90, at 653 (“Opinions . . . disclose but little of how
judges come to their conclusions. The opinions are often ex post facto; they are censored
expositions.”).
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private market.
A. Impact of Specialization on Bankruptcy Court Decisions
One argument is that court specialization has had an impact on the
judiciary system. Prior to 1898, “[f]ederal bankruptcy legislation was
used as a temporary and emergency measure, appropriate only to deal
with the aftermath of economic downturn.”125 However, the Bankruptcy
Reform Act of 1978126 established the bankruptcy courts as specialized
courts.127 As specialized courts, bankruptcy courts have since developed
considerable experience with regard to bankruptcy matters and as a
result, tend to view cases pragmatically. This approach makes sense
where bankruptcy judges hear only bankruptcy cases—100% of their
caseload involves bankruptcy cases. In contrast, out of the 44,440 cases
pending in the federal appellate courts as of March 21, 2011, only 610 of
these cases involved bankruptcy matters.128 This number of bankruptcy
cases represents roughly one percent of the total caseload, divided among
various judges. Bankruptcy judges may be better equipped to understand
the implications of using § 546(e) to protect payments to shareholders as
a result of their wealth of experience129: “[s]pecialist judges can be, and
often are, recruited from the ranks of lawyers who have practiced in that
area, so they often come to the bench with relevant expertise.” 130

125. JEFFREY T. FERRIELL & EDWARD J. JANGER, UNDERSTANDING BANKRUPTCY
112 (3rd ed. 2012).
126. Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-598, § 402, 92 Stat. 2549,
2682 (1978).
127. “Specialized courts usually are defined as forums of highly limited jurisdiction
to which all of the cases of a particular type are channeled.” Rochelle C. Dreyfuss,
Forums of the Future: The Role of Specialized Courts in Resolving Business Disputes, 61
BROOK. L. REV. 1, 5 (1995). Bankruptcy courts typically fall within this category. See
Jeffrey J. Rachlinski, et al., Inside the Bankruptcy Judge’s Mind, 86 B.U. L. REV. 1227,
1228 (2006).
128. See Table B-1: U.S. Courts of Appeals—Appeals Commenced, Terminated,
and Pending, by Circuit, During the 12 Month Period Ending March 31, 2011, U. S.
COURTS.GOV,
http://www.uscourts.gov/Viewer.aspx?doc=/uscourts/Statistics/FederalJudicialCaseloadS
tatistics/2011/tables/B01Mar11.pdf (last visited Apr. 13, 2014).
129. See Fox, supra note 58, at 572 (“Stripping the bankruptcy trustee or debtor of
avoidance powers for payments to shareholders in connection with an LBO potentially
encourages poorly planned LBOs and may facilitate funneling cash away from failing
companies to the detriment of the creditors.” (footnote omitted)).
130. Rachlinski et al., supra note 127, at 1229.
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Bankruptcy judges issuing decisions interpreting § 546(e) had been
practicing within the bankruptcy field for an average of about twentynine years prior to deciding the case at hand.131 On the other hand,
federal appellate judges had spent an average of 0.75 years exclusively
practicing in the bankruptcy field prior to issuing a decision in regard to
§ 546(e).132 This “reflects only the practical reality that district court
[and appellate court] judges are usually not much interested in
bankruptcy and are overwhelmed with other litigation.”133 Although
there is some criticism of court specialization,134 “[t]he romantic view of
the generalist federal judge, however, is not without its costs. Obsession
with the generalist deprives the federal judiciary of potential expertise,
which could be extremely useful in cases involving complex doctrines
and specialized knowledge,”135 particularly in cases construing § 546(e).
B. Bankruptcy Courts as Courts of Equity
The disparity of interpretation reflects the notion that bankruptcy
judges typically view the transactions in terms of equity,136 whereas the
federal appellate judges view the transactions in terms of law. This may
be particularly true where “[t]he function of bankruptcy courts is to
implement the social policy set forth in bankruptcy law.”137 This is

131. See infra Appendix II.
132. See infra Appendix III.
133. FERRIELL & JANGER, supra note 125, at 130; see Stephen Lubben, The Need
for More Bankruptcy Knowledge on the Circuit Courts, CREDIT SLIPS (March 30, 2010,
12:16
PM),
http://www.creditslips.org/creditslips/2010/03/the-need-for-morebankruptcy-knowledge-on-the-circuit-courts.html.
134. Rachlinski et al., supra note 127, at 1230 (“Here, we report evidence showing
that bankruptcy judges are vulnerable to anchoring and framing effects . . . .”).
135. Edward K. Cheng, The Myth of the Generalist Judge, 61 STAN. L. REV. 519,
524 (2008).
136. “The Supreme Court has recognized for many years that bankruptcy courts
‘are essentially courts of equity, and their proceedings [are] inherently proceedings in
equity.’” KENNETH N. KLEE, BANKRUPTCY AND THE SUPREME COURT 223 (2008)
(alteration in original). However, there exists a strong debate surrounding origins of
bankruptcy courts as courts of equity. See, e.g., Marcia S. Krieger, “The Bankruptcy
Court Is A Court of Equity”: What Does That Mean?, 50 S.C. L. REV. 275, 275-76
(1999). Much of this argument centers on Bankruptcy Code § 105(a), which allows a
bankruptcy court to “issue any order, process, or judgment that is necessary or
appropriate to carry out the provisions of this title.” Id. at 307 n.208 (quoting 11 U.S.C.
§105(a) (2012)).
137. Krieger, supra note 136, at 276.
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demonstrated by the fact that, “whether by liquidation or reorganization,
To
[bankruptcy law] serves admittedly equitable objectives.”138
understand this explanation, one must first consider how this emphasis
on equity in the bankruptcy courts came to be.
“Article III, Section 2 of the United States Constitution and the
Judiciary Act of 1789, as amended, confer and delegate, respectively,
equitable authority to federal district judges . . . .”139 Under the
Bankruptcy Acts of 1867 and 1898, district courts were defined as
“courts of bankruptcy,” and were given original jurisdiction in all matters
and proceedings in bankruptcy.140 Congress later repealed the Act of
1898 and replaced it with the Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978,141 thereby
revoking the bankruptcy court’s explicit powers as a court of equity.142
Although not truly a court of equity, it is still true that “[b]ankruptcy
laws, by their nature, embody a compromise between fundamental,
competing social and economic objectives.”143
There is a similar argument that bankruptcy courts are involved in
the practice of legal realism. “[Legal] [r]ealists s[eek] the moral
dimension in law, not in rules and principles or the higher law appraisals
of rules and principles, but in the process of responsible decision.” 144
This legal theory underlies the pragmatic approach of the bankruptcy
judges, particularly where “legal realists consider[] . . . solutions to
practical social problems[] . . . [and maintain] a common sense approach
to legal analysis.”145
Whether labeled equity or legal realism, it is clear that
considerations of fairness and the potential for abuse typically trouble
bankruptcy judges; these opinions often articulate that § 546(e) permits
“a nominal number of shareholders to receive windfall profits at the
expense of employee pension plans, retirement plans, mutual funds, and

138. Id.
139. Alan M. Ahart, The Limited Scope of Implied Powers of A Bankruptcy Judge:
A Statutory Court of Bankruptcy, Not a Court of Equity, 79 AM. BANKR. L.J. 1, 12 (2005)
(emphasis added) (construing U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2).
140. See id. at 16-19.
141. Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-598, § 401, 92 Stat. 2549,
2682 (1978).
142. Ahart, supra note 139, at 22.
143. Krieger, supra note 136, at 276.
144. Ambrosio, supra note 97, at 34.
145. Id.
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other entities that manage funds belonging to millions of individuals.”146
Furthermore, the majority of unsecured creditors cannot realistically
protect themselves; instead, “powerful creditors will protect themselves
while less advantageously situated creditors have no comparable means
of protection.”147
The notion of bankruptcy courts as courts of equity is further
reflected in an equitable doctrine, known as the ‘collapsing doctrine,’
developed in the context of LBOs and unique to the bankruptcy courts.
Where a focus of fraudulent transfer analysis is whether the transaction
involved sufficient consideration, as required under § 548 or state law
through § 544, a threshold inquiry in certain fraudulent transfer actions is
whether the particular transactions sought to be avoided can be
considered in isolation or should be considered as part of an integrated
transaction.148 The collapsing doctrine has been applied where many
variations on the classic LBO have been structured in order to sidestep
the fraudulent transfer analysis of the archetypical form,149 allowing
courts to avoid creative circumvention of the law.150 The essence of this
doctrine is that despite the structural variations in the LBO, the
underlying transaction remains substantively the same.151 Despite the
strategic manipulation of the transactions within the LBO, “once the
LBO transactions are collapsed, sufficient consideration is unlikely to be
found unless concrete indirect benefits accrue for the target
corporation.”152 This result provides the potential for significant

146. Parikh, supra note 9, at 310-11.
147. Liss, supra note 40, at 1512.
148. In recent years, courts have increasingly looked to the “the overall effect of the
LBO on the target corporation . . . rather than the effect of each discrete transaction.”
Blackwood, supra note 8, at 362.
149. See Garfinkel, supra note 7, at 57 (“A properly structured LBO might be
arranged, however, so that the individual steps of the buyout, when viewed as discrete
transactions, may not be constructively fraudulent as to creditors.”). These variations in
structure will not be discussed in this Note. For further discussion, see Carlson, supra
note 6, at 81-83.
150. See, e.g., Wieboldt Stores, Inc. v. Schottenstein, 94 B.R. 488, 503 (Bankr.
N.D. Ill. 1988) (“[T]he formal structure of the transaction alone cannot shield the LBO
lenders or the controlling . . . shareholders from Wieboldt's fraudulent conveyance
claims.”). The focus is on the net effect to honest creditors. See id.
151. The Supreme Court has held that “a bankruptcy court, as a court of equity,
may look through form to substance when determining the true nature of a transaction as
it relates to the rights of parties against a bankrupt’s estate.” KLEE, supra note 136, at
224 (discussing Pepper v. Litton, 308 U.S. 295 (1939)).
152. Blackwood, supra note 8, at 362.
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recovery to creditors, who would otherwise have no remedy. However,
the collapsing doctrine has no true legal basis in the Bankruptcy Code.153
The collapsing doctrine reflects the same set of ideas that underlie the
bankruptcy judges’ restricted application of § 546(e), including the
protection of small, unsophisticated creditors.
Where sentiments of equity are pertinent, it is evident that
bankruptcy judges are responding to equity-based variables rather than
purely legal rules and principles. There is much criticism that the
characterization of bankruptcy court as courts of equity is no longer
appropriate, particularly where bankruptcy courts apply a statutory
scheme rather than equitable maxims and do not operate in the same
fashion as true courts of equity once did.154 As a result, federal appellate
courts may, in fact, be attempting to remedy this trend,155 justifying the
application of § 546(e) and thereby exempting payments made to selling
shareholders from avoidance by distinguishing results that may seem
‘unfair’ from those that are ‘unjust.’156 This trend among the federal
appellate courts demonstrates an attempt to curb the bankruptcy courts’
ability to take equitable action in situations where the Bankruptcy Code
(supposedly) expresses some limited intent.157
C. The Self-Regulating Market
Another explanation for the different treatment of § 546(e) between
bankruptcy judges and federal appellate judges is that the latter are proprivate market. There are two positions regarding the use of fraudulent
transfer law to regulate LBOs. One position suggests that fraudulent
153. The collapsing doctrine may be justified by Bankruptcy Code § 105(a), which
allows a bankruptcy court to “issue any order, process, or judgment that is necessary or
appropriate to carry out the provisions of this title.” 11 U.S.C. §105(a) (2012). However,
“[a]lthough the bankruptcy court has broad equitable power to issue orders in aid of its
jurisdiction, the [Supreme] Court has limited this power when the relief granted is
inconsistent with provisions of the . . . Bankruptcy Code.” KLEE, supra note 136, at 229.
154. See Krieger, supra note 136, at 310.
155. When a “case is appealed, the upper court usually devotes its opinions to an
approval or criticism of the formal-law language which was intoned by the lower court
judge.” Frank, supra note 90, at 663.
156. See In re Quality Stores, Inc., 355 B.R. 629, 635 n.5 (Bankr. W.D. Mich.
2006); see also Schilling, supra note 24, at 488.
157. “[W]hatever equitable powers remain in the bankruptcy courts must and can
only be exercised within the confines of the Bankruptcy Code.” Norwest Bank
Worthington v. Ahlers, 485 U.S. 197, 206 (1988).
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transfer law need not apply in the context of an LBO because the market
itself is regulation enough; the parties can protect themselves.158 Some
courts go so far as to suggest that if fraudulent conveyance laws are
applied to LBOs indiscriminately, this acquisition method may be
judicially discouraged.159 Although federal appellate court judges have
not spoken expressly about why they choose not to apply fraudulent
transfer law, the fact that the LBOs are left unregulated implicitly
supports the argument that these judges do not believe that regulation is
necessary. On the other hand, bankruptcy decisions have outcomes
consistent with the theory that the market is not sufficiently protecting
unsecured creditors; bankruptcy judges do not trust the market.
The data clearly indicate that bankruptcy judges have adopted a
pragmatic analysis of § 546(e) while federal appellate judges instead
have adopted a purely textual analysis. This remarkable difference of
interpretation demonstrates a clear departure from legal formalism. As I
have demonstrated, these decisions are guided instead by the
specialization of the bankruptcy courts, the recognition that bankruptcy
courts are acting as courts of equity, and the attitudinal differences
towards judicial regulation of the private market.
VIII. Conclusion
“In enacting and amending section 546(e) of the Bankruptcy Code,
Congress has stated on numerous occasions that its purpose is to protect
financial markets from the systemic risk posed by a bankruptcy [T]rustee
asserting avoidance claims to unwind certain transactions that might

158. Baird and Jackson argue that creditors can protect themselves from the risk of
the debtor’s insolvency, “based on a conception of fraudulent conveyance law as a
species of contract law.” Liss, supra note 40, at 1511 (discussing Douglas G. Baird &
Thomas H. Jackson, Fraudulent Conveyance Law and its Proper Domain, 38 VAND. L.
REV. 829, 835-36 (1985)). This argument suggests that unsecured creditors are wholly
capable of obtaining a perfected security interest, a letter of credit from the bank, or
charging a fee for assuming the risk. See id. at 1512 (“A security interest gives the
creditor the right to declare default and proceed directly against the collateral without
resorting to judicial process, and assets can be appropriated to the full extent of the
claim.”).
159. See, e.g., In re Morse Tool, Inc. 108 B.R. 389 (Bankr. D. Mass. 1989); see
also Simkovic & Kaminetzky, supra note 9, at 137 (“[T]oo broad an application of
fraudulent transfer law to these transactions would discourage useful business
ventures.”).
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impact the markets.”160 However, as I have demonstrated, bankruptcy
judges and federal appellate judges disagree fundamentally as to whether
§ 546(e) is limited to transactions involving financial markets. While
bankruptcy judges typically interpret § 546(e) narrowly in order to
prevent the apparent injustice of paying shareholders before bona fide
creditors, reviewing federal appellate judges consistently interpret §
546(e) broadly, thereby shielding all stock transactions from avoidance.
Although both courts use formal legal reasoning as a vehicle to explain
the outcomes, the divided interpretation suggests that the decisions are
justified not merely on the language of the legislation, but rather, are
influenced by the specialization of the bankruptcy courts, the recognition
that bankruptcy courts are acting as courts of equity, and the attitudinal
differences towards judicial regulation of the private market. Legal
formalism does not provide an explanation for the different outcomes.

160. Merrett & Chase, supra note 46.
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§ 546(e) Applies to Protect Shareholders

Bankruptcy
First Circuit

District

Bankruptcy
First Circuit

In re Healthco
Int’l, Inc., 195
B.R. 971
(Bankr. D.
Mass. 1996)
Autonomous

Zahn v. Yucaipa Capital
Fund, 218
B.R. 656
(D.R.I. 1998)

Second Circuit

Appellate

District

Appellate

Second Circuit

In re Enron
Corp., 328
B.R. 58
(Bankr.
S.D.N.Y. 2005)
Autonomous
In re Enron
Corp., 323
B.R. 857
(Bankr.
S.D.N.Y. 2005)
Autonomous
In re Enron
Corp., 341
B.R. 451
(Bankr.
S.D.N.Y. 2006)
Autonomous
In re Norstan
Apparel Shops,
Inc., 367 B.R.
68 (Bankr.
E.D.N.Y.
2007)
Autonomous
In re Manhattan Inv. Fund
Ltd., 359 B.R.
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510 (Bankr.
S.D.N.Y.
2007), aff’d in
part, rev’d in
part, 397 B.R.
1 (S.D.N.Y.
2007)
Autonomous
In re Enron
Creditors Recovery Corp.,
407 B.R. 17
(Bankr.
S.D.N.Y.
2009), rev’d,
422 B.R. 423
(S.D.N.Y.
2009)
Autonomous
In re Enron
Creditors
Recovery
Corp., 422
B.R. 423
(S.D.N.Y.
2009)
In re MacMenamin’s
Grill Ltd., 450
B.R. 414
(Bankr.
S.D.N.Y. 2011)
Autonomous
In re Enron
Creditors Recovery Corp.,
651 F.3d 329
(2d Cir. 2011)
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In re Quebecor
World
(USA) Inc.,
480 B.R.
468
(S.D.N.Y.
2012)
AP Servs.
LLP v. Silva, 483
B.R. 63
(S.D.N.Y.
2012)
In re Tribune Co.
Fraudulent
Conveyance
Litig., 499
B.R. 310
(S.D.N.Y.
2013)

In re Tougher
Indus., Inc.,
2013 WL
5592902
(Bankr.
N.D.N.Y.
2013)
Not Autonomous
Third Circuit

Third Circuit
In re Resorts
Int’l, Inc., 181
F.3d 505 (3d
Cir. 1999)
In re Fin.
Mgmt. Scis.,
Inc., 261 B.R.
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150 (Bankr.
W.D. Pa.
2001)
Not Autonomous
In re
Hechinger
Inv. Co. of
Del., 274
B.R. 71 (D.
Del. 2002)
In re OODC,
LLC, 321 B.R.
128 (Bankr. D.
Del. 2005)
Autonomous

In re Loranger Mfg. Corp.,
324 B.R. 575
(Bankr. W.D.
Pa. 2005)
Not Autonomous
In re Nat’l
Forge Co.,
344 B.R.
340 (W.D.
Pa. 2006)
In re Borden
Chems. &
Plastics Operating Ltd.
P’ship, 336
B.R. 214
(Bankr. D.
Del. 2006)
Not Autonomous
In re The IT
Group, Inc.,
359 B.R. 97
(Bankr. D.
Del. 2006)
Not Autono-
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mous

In re Plassein
Int’l Corp.,
366 B.R. 318
(Bankr. D.
Del. 2007)
Not Autonomous
In re Plassein Int’l
Corp., 388
B.R. 46 (D.
Del. 2008)
In re Elrod
Holdings
Corp., 394
B.R. 760
(Bankr. D.
Del. 2008)
Not Autonomous
In re Plassein
Int’l Corp.,
590 F.3d 252
(3d Cir. 2009)
In re Mervyn’s
Holdings, LLC,
426 B.R. 488
(Bankr. D. Del.
2010)
Autonomous
In re Appleseed’s Intermediate
Holdings,
LLC, 470
B.R. 289 (D.
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Del. 2012)

In re Qimonda
Richmond,
LLC, 467 B.R.
318 (Bankr. D.
Del. 2012)
Autonomous

In re U.S.
Mortg. Corp.,
491 B.R. 642
(Bankr. D.
N.J. 2013)
Not Autonomous
Fourth Circuit

Fourth Circuit

In re Blanton,
105 B.R. 321
(Bankr. E.D.
Va. 1989)
Autonomous
In re Derivium Capital,
LLC, 437
B.R. 798
(Bankr. D.
S.C. 2010)
Autonomous
Fifth Circuit

In re Derivium Capital
LLC, 716
F.3d 355,(4th
Cir. 2013)

Fifth Circuit
Wider v.
Wootton,
907 F.2d
570 (5th
Cir. 1990)
Jewel Recovery, L.P. v.
Gordon, 196
B.R. 348
(N.D. Tex.
1996)
In re Olympic
Natural Gas
Co., 258 B.R.
161 (Bankr.
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S.D. Tex.
2001)
Autonomous
In re Olympic
Natural Gas
Co., 294 F.3d
737 (5th Cir.
2002)
Lightfoot v.
MXEnergy,
Inc., 2011
WL
1899764
(E.D. La.
2011)
In re MBS
Mgmt. Servs.,
Inc., 690 F.3d
352 (5th Cir.
2012)
U.S. Bank
Nat’l Ass’n
v. Verizon
Comm.
Inc., 892 F.
Supp. 2d
805 (N.D.
Tex. 2012)
Sixth Circuit

Sixth Circuit
In re Grand
Eagle Companies, Inc.,
288 B.R. 484
(Bankr. N.D.
Ohio 2003)
Autonomous
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In re Quality
Stores Inc.,
355 B.R. 629
(Bankr. W.D.
Mich. 2006)
Autonomous
QSI Holdings, Inc. v.
Alford, 382
B.R. 731
(W.D.
Mich. 2007)
In re QSI
Holdings,
Inc., 571 F.3d
545 (6th Cir.
2009)
Seventh Circuit

Seventh Circuit
Wieboldt
Stores, Inc. v.
Schottenstein,
131 B.R. 655
(N.D. Ill.
1991)
In re Renew
Energy LLC,
463 B.R. 475
(Bankr. W.D.
Wis. 2011)
Autonomous
In re Lancelot
Investors
Fund, L.P.,
467 B.R. 643
(Bankr. N.D.
Ill. 2012)
Autonomous

Eighth Circuit
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In re Contemporary
Indus. Corp.,
2007 WL
5256918
(Bankr. D.
Neb. June 29,
2007)
Autonomous
Contemporary
Indus. Corp.
v. Frost, 564
F.3d 981 (8th
Cir. 2009)
Ninth Circuit

Ninth Circuit
In re Comark,
124 B.R. 806
(Bankr. C.D.
Cal. 1991)
Autonomous
In re Comark,
145 B.R. 47
(B.A.P. 9th
Cir. 1992)
Autonomous
In re Comark,
971 F.2d 322
(9th Cir.
1992)
In re Hamilton Taft &
Co., 176 B.R.
895 (Bankr.
N.D. Cal.
1995)
Not Autonomous
In re Hamilton Taft
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& Co., 196
B.R. 532
(N.D. Cal.
1995)
In re Hamilton Taft &
Co., 114 F.3d
991 (9th Cir.
1997)

In re Grafton
Partners, L.P.,
321 B.R. 527
(B.A.P. 9th
Cir. 2005)
Autonomous
Tenth Circuit

Tenth Circuit

In re Republic
Fin. Corp., 75
B.R. 840
(Bankr. N.D.
Okla. 1987)
Autonomous
In re Kaiser
Steel Corp.,
105 B.R. 639
(Bankr. D. Colo. 1989),
rev’d, 110 B.R.
514 (D. Colo.
1990)
Autonomous
Kaiser Steel
Corp. v.
Charles
Schwab &
Co., 913 F.2d
846 (10th Cir.
1990)
In re Kaiser
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Steel Corp.,
952 F.2d
1230 (10th
Cir. 1991)

In re Kaiser
Merger Litig.,
168 B.R. 991
(D. Colo.
1994)
In re Integra
Realty Res.,
Inc., 198 B.R.
352 (Bankr. D.
Colo. 1996)
Autonomous
In re Yeagley,
220 B.R. 402
(Bankr. D.
Kan. 1998)
Not Autonomous
In re D.E.I.
Sys., Inc., 2011
WL 1261603
(Bankr. D.
Utah April 5,
2011)
Autonomous
Eleventh Circuit

Eleventh Circuit

In re Int’l Gold
Bullion Exch.,
Inc., 53 B.R.
660 (Bankr.
S.D. Fla. 1985)
Autonomous
In re
Munford,
Inc., 98
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F.3d 604
(11th Cir.
1996)
In re Bankest
Capital Corp.,
374 B.R. 333
(Bankr. S.D.
Fla. 2007)
Not Autonomous
Total Bankruptcy: 18
Autonomous:
17
NonAutonomous: 1
17/27 (63%)
autonomous
bankruptcy
court decisions held §
546(e) does
NOT apply
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Total District:
5

Total Appellate: 2
2/14
(14%)
appellate
court decisions
held §
546(e)
does NOT
apply

Total Bankruptcy: 20
Autonomous:
10
NonAutonomous:
10
10/27 (37%)
autonomous
bankruptcy
court decisions held §
546(e) applies

Total District: 11

Total Appellate: 12
12/14 (86%)
appellate
court decisions held §
546(e) applies
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Appendix II
Bankruptcy Judges
§ 546(e) Does NOT Apply to Protect Shareholders
Bankruptcy Court

Judge
(No. years practicing bankruptcy
prior to decision)1

In re Healthco Int’l, Inc., 195
B.R. 971 (Bankr. D. Mass.
1996)

James F. Queenan, Jr. (1958-1996)
38

In re Norstan Apparel Shops,
Inc., 367 B.R. 68 (Bankr.
E.D.N.Y. 2007)

Carla E. Craig (1980-1999)
19

In re Enron Corp., 323 B.R.
857 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2005)

Arthur J. Gonzalez (1983-2005)
22

In re Enron Corp., 328 B.R.
58 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2005)

Arthur J. Gonzalez (1983-2005)
22

In re Enron Corp., 341 B.R.
451 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2006)

Arthur J. Gonzalez (1983-2006)
23

In re Enron Creditors
Recovery Corp., 407 B.R. 17
(Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2009),
rev’d, 422 B.R. 423 (S.D.N.Y.
2009)
In re Manhattan Inv. Fund
Ltd., 359 B.R. 510 (Bankr.
S.D.N.Y. 2007)

Arthur J. Gonzalez (1983-2009)
26

In re MacMenamin’s Grill
Ltd., 450 B.R. 414 (Bankr.
S.D.N.Y. 2011)

Robert D. Drain (1985-2011)
16

First Circuit

Second Circuit

Burton R. Lifland (1954-2007)
53

Third Circuit

1. Data obtained from Westlaw Next Profiler
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In re OODC, LLC, 321 B.R.
128 (Bankr. D. Del. 2005)

Mary F. Walrath (1979-2005)
26

In re Mervyn’s Holdings,
LLC, 426 B.R. 488 (Bankr. D.
Del. 2010)

Kevin Gross (1977-2010)
33

In re Qimonda Richmond,
LLC, 467 B.R. 318 (Bankr. D.
Del. 2012)

Mary F. Walrath (1979-2012)
33

In re Grafton Partners, L.P.,
321 B.R. 527 (B.A.P. 9th Cir.
2005)

Christopher M. Klein (CJ) (19762005)
29

In re D.E.I. Sys., Inc., 2011
WL 1261603 (Bankr. D. Utah
April 5, 2011)

R. Kimball Mosier (1980-2011)
31

In re Kaiser Steel Corp., 105
B.R. 639 (Bankr. D. Colo.
1989), rev’d, 110 B.R. 514 (D.
Colo. 1990)

Charles E. Matheson (1961-1989)
28

In re Integra Realty Res., Inc.,
198 B.R. 352 (Bankr. D. Colo.
1996)

Patricia A. Clark (1961-1996)
35

In re Republic Fin. Corp., 75
B.R. 840 (Bankr. N.D. Okla.
1987)

Glen E. Clark (1971-1987)
16

Fourth Circuit

Fifth Circuit

Seventh Circuit

Eighth Circuit

Ninth Circuit

Tenth Circuit

https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol34/iss3/8
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Eleventh
Circuit
In re Bankest Capital Corp.,
374 B.R. 333 (Bankr. S.D.
Fla. 2007)

A. Jay Cristol (1959-2007)
48

In re Int’l Gold Bullion Exch.,
Inc., 53 B.R. 660 (Bankr. S.D.
Fla. 1985)

Sidney M. Weaver (1954-1985)
31

Total Bankruptcy: 18

Years Total: 529/18
Average: 29.38
The average bankruptcy judge
practiced bankruptcy for 29.38
years prior to issuing a decision
holding that § 546(e) did not apply
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§ 546(e) Applies to Protect Shareholders
Bankruptcy Court

Judge
(No. years practicing
bankruptcy prior to decision)2

In re Tougher Indus., Inc.,
2013 WL 5592902 (Bankr.
N.D.N.Y. Oct. 10, 2013)

Robert E. Littlefield, Jr. (19782013)
35

In re Plassein Int’l Corp., 366
B.R. 318 (Bankr. D. Del. 2007)

Kevin Gross (1978-2007)
29

In re Elrod Holdings Corp., 394
B.R. 760 (Bankr. D. Del. 2008)

Brendan Linehan Shannon
(1992-2008)
16
Mary F. Walrath (1979-2006)
33

First Circuit
Second Circuit

Third Circuit

In re The IT Group, Inc., 359
B.R. 97 (Bankr. D. Del. 2006)
In re Borden Chems. & Plastics
Operating Ltd. P’ship, 336 B.R.
214 (Bankr. D. Del. 2006)
In re Fin. Mgmt. Scis., Inc., 261
B.R. 150 (Bankr. W.D. Pa.
2001)

Peter J. Walsh (1964-2006)
42

In re Loranger Mfg. Corp., 324
B.R. 575 (Bankr. W.D. Pa.
2005)

Judith K. Fitzgerald (19732005)
32

In re Blanton, 105 B.R. 321
(Bankr. E.D. Va. 1989)

Douglas O. Tice, Jr. (19571989)
32

Bernard Markovitz (1965-2001)
36

Fourth Circuit

2. Data obtained from Westlaw Next Profiler

https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol34/iss3/8
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In re Derivium Capital, LLC,
437 B.R. 798 (Bankr. D. S.C.
2010)

John E. Waites (1980-2010)
30

In re U.S. Mortg. Corp., 491
B.R. 642 (Bankr. D. N.J. 2013)

Rosemary Gambardella (19792013)
34

In re Olympic Natural Gas Co.,
258 B.R. 161 (Bankr. S.D. Tex.
2001)

William R. Greendyke (19792001)
22

In re Quality Stores Inc., 355
B.R. 629 (Bankr. W.D. Mich.
2006)

James D. Gregg (1977-2006)
29

In re Grand Eagle Companies,
Inc., 288 B.R. 484 (Bankr. N.D.
Ohio 2003)

Marilyn Shea-Stonum (19752003)
28

In re Lancelot Investors Fund,
L.P., 467 B.R. 643 (Bankr.
N.D. Ill. 2012)
In re Renew Energy LLC, 463
B.R. 475 (Bankr. W.D. Wis.
2011)

Jacqueline P. Cox (1978-2012)
34

In re Contemporary Indus.
Corp., 2007 WL 5256918
(Bankr. D. Neb. 2007)

Timothy J. Mahoney (19722007)
35

In re Comark, 124 B.R. 806
(Bankr. C.D. Cal. 1991)
In re Comark, 145 B.R. 47
(B.A.P. 9th Cir. 1992)

James N. Barr (1972-1991)
19
Elizabeth L. Perris (1976-1992)
16

In re Hamilton Taft & Co., 176
B.R. 895 (Bankr. N.D. Cal.
1995)

Thomas E. Carlson (1976-1995)
19

Fifth Circuit

Sixth Circuit

Seventh Circuit

Robert D. Martin (1969-2011)
33

Eighth Circuit

Ninth Circuit

Tenth Circuit
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In re Yeagley, 220 B.R. 402
(Bankr. D. Kan. 1998)

John T. Flannagan (1964-1998)
34

Total Bankruptcy: 20

Years Total: 588 /20
Average: 29.40
The average appellate judge
practiced bankruptcy for 29.40
years prior to issuing a decision
holding that § 546(e) applied

Eleventh Circuit
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Appendix III
Appellate Judges
§ 546(e) Does NOT Apply to Protect Shareholders
Appellate Court

Judge
(No. years practicing bankruptcy prior to
decision) 1

Wider v. Wootton, 907
F.2d 570 (5th Cir. 1990)

Samuel D. Johnson, Jr. - 0

In re Munford, Inc., 98
F.3d 604 (11th Cir. 1996)

Per curiam – 0

First Circuit

Second Circuit

Third Circuit

Fourth Circuit

Fifth Circuit

Seventh Circuit

Eighth Circuit

Ninth Circuit

Tenth Circuit

Eleventh Circuit

1

. Data obtained from Westlaw Next Profiler
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Total Appellate: 2
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Years Total: 0/2
Average: 0
The average appellate judge practiced
bankruptcy for 0 years prior to issuing a
decision holding that § 546(e) did not apply
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§ 546(e) Applies to Protect Shareholders
Appellate Court

Judge
(No. years practicing bankruptcy prior to decision)2

In re Enron Creditors Recovery Corp., 651 F.3d 329
(2d Cir. 2011)

John M. Walker, Jr. - 0

In re Plassein Int’l Corp.,
590 F.3d 252 (3d Cir.
2009)
In re Resorts Int’l, Inc.,
181 F.3d 505 (3d Cir.
1999)

Morton Ira Greenberg - 0

In re Derivium Capital
LLC, 716 F.3d 355,(4th
Cir. 2013)

James Andrew Wynn Jr. - 0

In re Olympic Natural Gas
Co., 294 F.3d 737 (5th Cir.
2002)

Emilio M. Garza - 0

In re MBS Mgmt. Servs.,
Inc., 690 F.3d 352 (5th Cir.
2012)

Edith H. Jones - 9

In re QSI Holdings, Inc.,
571 F.3d 545 (6th Cir.
2009)

Alan E. Norris - 0

First Circuit

Second Circuit

Third Circuit

Richard Lowell Nygaard- 0

Fourth Circuit

Fifth Circuit

Sixth Circuit

Seventh Circuit

2

. Data obtained from Westlaw Next Profiler
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Eighth Circuit
Contemporary Indus. Corp.
v. Frost, 564 F.3d 981 (8th
Cir. 2009)

Clarence Arlen Beam - 0

In re Comark, 971 F.2d
322 (9th Cir. 1992)

Melvin T. Brunetti - 0

In re Hamilton Taft & Co.,
114 F.3d 991 (9th Cir.
1997)

William A. Norris – 0

Kaiser Steel Corp. v.
Charles Schwab & Co.,
Inc., 913 F.2d 846 (10th
Cir. 1990)
In re Kaiser Steel Corp.,
952 F.2d 1230 (10th Cir.
1991)

Stephen H. Anderson - 0

Total Appellate: 12

Years Total: 9/12
Average: 0.75
The average appellate judge practiced
bankruptcy for 0.75 years prior to
issuing a decision holding that §
546(e) applied

Ninth Circuit

Tenth Circuit

Stephen H. Anderson – 0

Eleventh Circuit

https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol34/iss3/8
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